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Introduction 
The fact that both labour and capital can remain underutilized over very long periods 
of time is one of the most striking stylized facts in macroeconomics. On the one hand, 
the explanation of unemployment has been tackled by a large strand of the New Keyne-
sian literature. These models often rely on non-competitive wage and price mechanism 
in short-run frameworks, i.e., without including any growth process. On the other hand, 
growth theory expanded quickly this last decade, trying to explain long-run accumulation 
process on the basis that all markets are perfectly competitive. This approach neglects 
the fact that the labour market seems to be characterised by persistent underemploy-
ment but also the fact that equipment could remain underutilised at lenght. These two 
facts should affect the accumulation process, and therefore the long-run movements of 
the economy. In this paper, we present a growth model with persistent unemployment 
and underutilization of equipment. The aim is to make a first step towards a complete 
treatment of underemployment with the growth theory toolbox and to show that this does 
not require any price rigidity assumption. It will be shown that long-run underutilization 
of productive factors can be due to the combinaison of the two following elements: (i) 
Irreversibility of capital, technology, and skill decisions (implying firm-specific skills), (ii) 
firm specific shocks on productivity. Underemployment will results from the fact that the 
irreversible skill decisions of the households and the investment decisions of the firms are 
taken without knowing with certainty the firms productivity for the next period. This 
implies that agents will invest their human and physical capital in some firms that will 
be hit by a negative shock, generating underemployment of their resources, while other 
firms'are hitten by a positive shock, but are unable to benefit fully from it, because there 
is a lack of capital and skills in their micro-market. 
In this framework we are also able to analyse the effects of unions on accumulation 
in the presence of underemployment and underutilization of capital. Devereux and Lock-
wood (1991 ) have shown that the analysis of the effect of unions on capital accumulation 
in a general equilibrium perspective gives very different results than the one in partial 
equilibrium~ as in Grout (1984). This is basically due to the fact that the interest rate 
is made endogenous. An interesting feature of unions overlapping generation model is 
that the bargaining between workers and firms is also, in this context, a bargaining be-
tween young saver workers and old dissaver capitalists. In this paper, the interactions 
between unions and long-run unemployment are studied. In particular it is shown that 
the presence of unions is neither sufficient nor necessary for having unemployment. 
An important result of Devereux and Lockwood (1991) is that union power affects 
positively the capital stock in both the binding and non-binding contract case. This is 
because an increase in union power increases the wages and the savings of the young 
generation. However, it is shown in this paper that their result depends crucially on their 
assumption of zero depreciation of the capital stock. We assume here a full depreciation 
of the capital stock, which is consistent with our irreversibility assumption. In this case 
the effect of a rise in union power is ambiguous. 
The recent literature on quantity rationing models show some examples of the existence 
of unemployment and underutilizaton of capacities at equilibrium. Sneessens (1987), Li-
candro (1992c) and Arnsperger and de la Croix (1993) show that, in a general equilibrium 
model with monopolistic competition and wage bargaining, the existence of complemen-
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tarity in the production technology and of firm specific uncertainty gives an explanation 
to the natural rate of unemployment. In a partial equilibrium model, Licandro (1992a) 
and (1992b) shows that, under these assumptions, capacities are generally underemployed, 
even at steady state. de la Croix (1992) analyses the dynamic of unemployment and the 
degree of capacity utilization in a dynamic model of this type. Our model is built on these 
previous work, after having abandoned the assumptions related to nominal rigidities and 
monopolistic competition on the goods market. 
Our framework has little in common with the new branch of dynamic disequilibrium 
models represented e.g. by Van Marrewijk and Verbeek (1993) and Weddepohl and Y-
ildrim (1993) in the sense that our unemployment is not generated by price rigidities (real 
and/or nominal) but by technical rigidities and uncertainty, which seems more appropriate 
in a growth model. 
The main assumptions under which the model is built are the following. First, it is 
a two period overlapping generation model, as in Diamond (1965), with perfect competi-
tion on the goods market and wage bargaining in the labor market, as in Devereux and 
Lockwood (1991). Secondly, there is irreversibility of technological choices (a putty-clay 
technology). As it is standard in OLG models, the capital stock is decided one period 
before. Associated with this capital stock there is a given technology, i.e., even if the 
ex-ante production function is Cobb-Douglas, the choice of the capital- labor ratio is tak-
en at the same time that the equipment is bought. Third, the factors of production are 
firm specific, i.e., the labor market is segmented and investment is irreversible. Finally, 
it is assumed that the productivity of capital is random and that the firm faces some 
uncertainty when it is choosing the capital stock and the capital/labor ratio. 
The timing, even if it is relatively standard, is relevant in generating underemployment 
of production factors. As stated before, technological and accumulation choices are made 
one period in advance under uncertainty. Wage and employment are decided at the 
beginning of each period, after the realization of the technological shock, by an efficient 
bargain at the firm level. Consumption, savings and production takes place simultaneously 
under full-information. 
The model 
It is a standard OLG model, where Nt represents the members of generation t and n 
the growth rate of population. Individuals live three periods. They are kids in the first 
period, young workers in the second period and old capitalists in the third period. Kids 
do not work and do not consume at all in their first period of life; they only must choose 
a firm specific human capital i. I Since expected labor incomes are the same for all types of 
human capital, kids select randomly their qualification implying that they are uniformely 
over the different segments of the labor market. The young-worker consumes, saves for 
future consumption and offers inelastically one unit of labor. The old-capitalist, who holds 
shares and debts issued by firms, only consumes. At the end of each period, old-capitalists 
sell their shares to young-workers. 
lThe introduction of kids in the model is a simple way to rationalize the skill decision. This does not 
modify the formal structure of the model, so that it is comparable to the standard two-period Diamond 
111odei. A more refined analysis of this decision should ne an interesting extention of the model. 
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Firms live infinitly, hire labor, buy capital and produce. To finance their investments 
firms borrow from individuals. Any pure profits at equilibrium are distributed to the 
share-holders. 
Each machine, once installed, has a given productivity for both capital and labor, 
i.e., the technology is putty-clay. Decisions about the capital stock and productivities 
are taken by the firm one period ahead. At the time of the decision, there is uncertainty 
concerning the productivity of capital. However, this uncertainty is only firm specific so 
that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Investment is irreversible, i.e., it is specific to a 
particular firm and can not be valuable anywhere. 
There is a continuum of labor markets with specific human capital in the interval [0,1]. 
Each segment of this market is denoted by i. The number of workers in each segment of 
the market at period t is equal to Nt • We think as if there was one firm in each labour 
market (returns to scale are assumed constant). Since skills are labor market specific, the 
workers cannot move from one segment of the labor market to another. 
Finally, in each segment of the labor market the Nt young-workers are organized in a 
union. The union and the firm bargain over wages and employment as in the standard 
"efficient bargaining" model of McDonald and Solow (1981). 
1.1 The consumer problem 
Individuals have preferences over consumption when young CIt and consumption when old 
C2t+l:' These preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, which 
is the same for all individuals from all generations. However, individuals from the same 
generation have a different labor endowment, since labor is firm specific. An individual 
of generation t, with specific labor endowment i, solves the following problem 
0< 0 < 1 
subject to 
C2it+l 
Cl it + = Wit lit litE {O,1}.1 + rHl 
The real wage Wit and the interest rate rt are given, and employment lit can be 1 if 
employed or 0 if unemployed. 
The first order conditions for this problem are CIt = OWitlit and C2t+l = (1 - 0)(1 + 
rt+dWitlit. The corresponding individual savings Sit are 
(1) 
The indirect utility function of a young worker of generation t is proportional to 
(2) 
if he works and it is equal to zero if the worker is unemployed. 
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1.2 The putty-clay technology 
The firm '5 technology is putty-clay and the ex-ante production function of firm i is sup-
posed to be Cobb-Douglas, i.e., 
Yit = Lit Klt-a , (3) 
where Y represents production, L is employment and K the capital stock. The parameter 
Q: satisfies 0 < Q: < 1. 
Defining the ex-ante capital-labour ratio as Xit, the ex-post average labour productivity 
ais ait = x:t- , and the corresponding ex-post average capital productivity is bit = x~a /-lit. 
The ex-post production function is Leontief, i.e., 
v . {I-aL -aK }Lit = mm Xit it, Xit it /-lit . (4) 
The average productivity of capital is assumed stochastic, where /-lit is an idiosyncratic 
productivity shock coming from a known distribution F(/-lj 0, the same for all i and t. ~ 
is a vector of known parameters. We assume for simplicity that the productivity of labor 
is not stochastic. 
Given that in each segment of the labor market employment should be lower or equal 
to labour supply N t , equation (4) implies that: 
v < . {I-aN -a}' }Lit _ mm Xit t,Xit \it/-lit . (5) 
This says that the firm faces two constraints for producing: (i) the full-employment con-
straint which is equal to the number of labor-suppliers in this segment of the labor market 
N t multiplied by their average productivity, and (ii) the capacity constraint which is e-
qual to the capital stock Kit times its average productivity. All the components of both 
constraints were decided in the previous period. 
Assuming that /-lit is lognormally distributed with unit mean and variance (12, and 
using the result of Lambert (1988), expected production can be approximated by aCES 
function of the two expected contraints: 
(6) 
where p is a function of (12, the variance of the shock: 
2 f( -(1/2) 
p = -1 + ~ F(-(1/2)' 
where F is the standard normal distribution and f the corresponding density function. 
The interpretation of equation (6) is made clearer by considering Figure 1: The up-
ward sloping line decribes the known full-employment output as a function of the ex-ante 
capital/labour ratio. This ratio affects the constraints positively through its effect on 
the ex-post productivity of labour. The downward sloping curve describes the expected 
capacity constraint. If the location of this constraint was known with certainty output 
and expected output coincide and would simply be equal to the minimum of the two 
constraints. However, this is not the case since the capacity constraint is affected by a 
random term. Lambert'~ result says that expected output can be approximated by aCES 
function of the two constraints, which is the smooth curve of Figure 1. The distance 
between the CES and the lines is positively affected by the variance of the shock. An 
increase in (1 (i.e. in 1/p) moves the CES to the West. 
------------_._---------_. --------"---
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Figure 1: Expected production 
fit 
1.3 The Efficient Bargaining 
As stated before, the negociation is decentralized. In each segment of the labor market, 
firm 'and union bargain once the capital stock has been installed by the firm, which 
corresponds to the non-binding contract of Grout (1984). In this case, the firm must 
take into account in the previous period the effect of the capital stock and technological 
decisions on the wage and employment level. We solve therefore the model backwards, 
starting with the bargaining problem and ending with the capital and technological choice. 
The bargaining process is modeled using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The 
utility of the union is the sum of the indirect utility (2) of its members, where the fallback 
utility is zero. 
The objective of the firm is to maximize the expected discounted value of the flow of 
profits. The capital stock is fully depreciated after one period. 2 Time t profits are 
The firm maximises 
£'_1 [~O"~i"] , 
1where the discount rate is 67 = n:=t+l (1 +Tst . 
Assuming that once installed the capital stock can not be sold to other firms, even in 
2This is consistent with our irreversibility assumption and with the real time-hoziron of two-period 
overlapping generation models, say 30 years. Devereux and Lockwood (1991) assume a zero depreciation 
rate, It will be shown that their assumption is crucial in generating their result concerning the role of 
union power on the capital stock. 
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Figure 2: The efficient bargaining 
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case of breakdown in the negotiation, the expected fall-back profit is 
-(1 +Tt)Kit +Et- l [f 6T7riT] . 
T=t+l 
Therefore, the profit net of its fall-back is simply lit - Wit Lit . 
Each union-firm couple maximizes 
l Bmax (Lit Wit (1 +Tt+d - )13 (lit - LitWit)I-13 , 0<,8<1 
Wtt.L,t 
subject to equations (4) and (5). The parameter ,8 represents the relative power of the 
union in the negotiation. Given that the interest rate is exogenous at the firm level,3 the 
first order conditions for this problem are 
Wit ,8ait (7) 
lit aitLit (8) 
. { Kit }Lit mm Nt, - /-lit . (9)
Xit 
The outcome of the efficient bargain is represented in Figure 2 for the two possible 
branches of the min function in (9). In both cases, the wage is a share ,8 of average labour 
productivity. Notice that if the labour market was characterized by perfect competition, 
wages would differ across firms: If the productivity shock was such that capacities are 
smaller than full-employment output, the real wage would then be equal to the reservation 
wage (here 0) and there would be voluntary unemployment (Lit < Nt ). If the productivity 
3The internalisation of the capital market equilibrium by a centralized union in OLG models creates 
or increases dynamic inefficiency generating unemployment, see Cahuc (1991). 
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shock was large enough to ensure that capacities were greater than full-employment out-
put, the wage would be equal to marginal productivity and employment would be equal 
to Nt. 
The solution for L is a corner solution. If the productivity shock is bad (i.e., if 
J.lit ::; Nk~t!t), capacities are smaller than full-employment output, the capacity constrain-
t determines employment and there is ex-post involuntary unemployment (in the sense 
that unemployed persons are willing to work at the equilibrium wage). If the productivity 
shock good (i.e., if J.lit ~ NI,Xi'), full-employment occurs in this segment of the labor mar-
nit 
keto Notice that employment is not affected by union power, which is a standard result 
of efficient bargaining models when the workers are risk neutral (see Svejnar (1986)). 
1.4 The Technological Choice 
At period t - 1 there is uncertainty concerning the average productivity of capital for the 
next periods. The firm chooses the capital stock and the capital/labor ratio for time t by 
maximising the expected flow of profits, subject to the outcome of the future negotiation 
given by equations (7) to (9). Given the fact that the capital stock lives one period, the 
problem of the firm is a one period problem. Using (6), (7) and (8), the optimal capital 
stock and the optimal capital/labour ratio are given by: 
!pax (1 -;3) ((x~;oN r fP + (x;:,.o !{i,. fP) -:;;1 - (1 + r,. )I<i'" 
htt,XIt 
The first order condition for the capital/labour ratio is: 
( 1 -Q 
Q):;;1 I<it (10)
Xit = -- -,Nt 
Equation (10) says that the optimal capital/labour ratio is proportional to the capital 
stock per-capita. Following Lambert, the weighted probability of being capacity con-
strained is given by 
-OT.'] (Et-l(J'it))PPw [fit = Xit l\.itJ.lit = :-O}{. 
Xlt It 
Computing the value of this probability with equations (6) and (10), it can be shown that 
the optimally choosen weighted probability of being capacity constrained is 1 - Q. The 
ratio of expected production to expected capacities, denoted by dih verifies 
d. - Et - 1(fid - (1 _ )1It - -O}' - Q p. 
X it \. it 
In the same way, it can be shown that the weighted probability of being constrained by 
labour supply is Q. 
The first order condition for the capital stock merged with (10) gives: 
1 + rt = (1 -;3)(1 - Q)1+~ x~o. (11) 
The marginal cost of capital, at the right hand side of equation (12), is equal to the 
expected marginal productivity of capital times the firm power on the negociation, times 
dit : 
-8-
The marginal cost of capital should be smaller than that the expected marginal produc-
tivity of capital, i.e., (1 - o:)xi;Q. 
2 The aggregate equilibrium 
Since all firms are ex-ante identical (uncertainty is i specific and there is no aggregate 
uncertainty) they will all choose the same capital stock and the same capital/labour ratio. 
Conditions (IQ) and (11) verify at the aggregate, i.e., 
(12) 
and 
1- 0:) ~ 
Xt = -0:- kt, (13)( 
where kt = ~: is the capital stock per-capita. 
Moreover, since Xt is the same for all firms, all union-firm couples set the same real 
wage 
(14) 
Finally, aggregate output and aggregate employment are equal to firm's expected 
output and employment, implying that 
It ~ (1 + G:) -P) -l/p (15) 
and 
Yt = x t 
l- Q it, (16) 
where it = -k!; is the employment rate and Yt = #; is per-capita production. 
2.1 Underemployment of production factors 
Before closing the model by writing down the capital market equilibrium conditions, we are 
already able to prove our first results which are that capital and labor are underutilized. 
Combining (13) and (15) we derive the equilibrium value for aggregate employment 
(17) 
For all period t, employment is smaller than the labor supply. This result comes from the 
aggregation of heterogeneous situations. In the economy, firms facing a good productivity 
shock are able to hire all the workers in their segment of the labor market. At the same 
time, firms facing a bad shock are unable to hire all the workers in the corresponding 
segments of the labor market. At the aggregate, the weighted proportion of firms being 
constrained by labor supply is equal to 0:. Notice that this weighted proportion is equal 
to (L/N)P for all t and is equal to the weighted probability of full-employment constraint 
defined in section 1.4. In this economy, heterogeneity is related to uncertainty and it is 
at the basis of the existence of unemployment. 
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The corresponding unemployment rate is independent of time and it is given by 
1 
Ut = it = 1 - QP ~ 0 Vt. (18) 
It is zero only when p -t 00, in which case both uncertainty and heterogeneity vanish. 
Underemployment results from the fact that the irreversible skill decisions of the house-
holds and the investment decisions of the firms are taken without knowing with certainty 
the firms productivity for the next period. 
The degree of capacity utilization dt is defined as the ratio of aggregate production to 
aggregate capacities, i.e., 
d _ 1'; 
t - x;-a Kt 
Using (13), (15) and (16) it can be shown that dt is independent of time and that it takes 
the following value at equilibrium 
dt = d 
-
= (1 - Q) P 1 :::; 1 Vt. (19) 
The degree of capacity utilization is generally smaller than one. As for the unemployment 
rate, there is full-utilization of capacities only when p -t 00, i.e., when uncertainty and 
heterogeneity vanish. 
The economy exibits unemployment and underutilization of capacity at equilibrium. 
In this simple version of the model d and U take the same values for all periods. This is 
due to the Cobb-Douglas specification that has been chosen for the production function. 
More general functional forms would lead to a dynamic pattern of unemployment and 
capaci ty utilisation. 
Notice that the existence of underemployment does not depend on union's power. It is 
only linked to heterogeneity and irreversibility. Although, if households were risk averse 
and their indirect utility function would be concave in labor income, leading to an effect 
of union power on employment. 
Both heterogeneity and uncertainty play a crucial role in this economy. When un-
certainty and heterogeneity disappear (if p -t 00), capacities become full-employed and 
the unemployment rate goes to zero. When there is uncertainty but there is not het-
erogeneity, i.e., if uncertainty is not idiosyncratic, all firms will be in the same situation 
at equilibrium. Under these conditions two types of equilibrium could be possible, full-
employment with underutilization of capacities or full-capacity with unemployment. To 
generate simultaneously unemployment and underutilization of capacities the existence 
of heterogeneity is necessary. 
2.2 The capital/labor ratio 
In this framework we have three different capitaljlabor ratio: x represents the optimal 
capitaljlabor ratio which is incorporated in the existing machines, k represents the capital 
stock per-capita, and kll represents the effective capitaljlabor ratio. Using equations (13), 
(17) and (19) we know that 
)Xt = d-(kT;t . 
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The effective capital/labor ratio is greater than the optimal one because some units of 
capital are not employed at equilibrium. 
These three definitions of the capital/labour ratio are related by the following expres-
sion (coming from equation (15)): 
kt)P kP P ( 1; = + X t ·t 
This means that the effective capital/labour ratio (the one which is observed at the 
macroeconomic level) is a weighted average of (i) the capital stock per capital which is 
the capital/labour ratio prevailing in firms with a good productivity shock and (ii) the 
ex- ante capital/labour ratio which is the effective ratio prevailing in the firms with a bad 
productivity shock. 
2.3 The capital market equilibrium 
As stated in Section 1, individuals can put their savings in two different assets, debts 
and shares, both issued by firms. Intragenerational borrowing and lending is zero at 
equilibrium, because all individuals are identical. 
Even if expected profits are equal among firms, profits are different from one firm to one 
another depending on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. To avoid uncertainty in 
individual's problem, let us assume that individuals buy a share of the market portfolio 
composed by all the firm shares. 4 The return of the market portfolio is equal to the 
expected return of firms. As stated before, each share pays at t as dividend the time t 
profits. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the aggregate flow of profits is kwown 
and individuals can forecast correctly the share price qt for all futur periods. Expected 
profits are the same for all firms and equal to aggregate profits 7rt+1 = Y;+1 - Wt+1Lt+1' 
The expected return on a share is 
Et(qit+1 + 7rit+1) qt+1 + 7rt+1 
= 
For both shares and physical capital to be held at equilibrium, the arbitrage condition 
must hold: 
qt+l + 7rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 (20) 
qt 
Computing 7rt+1 with the aggregate equilibrium conditions (12) to (16) and the equilibrium 
values for u, one has 
7rt+1 = (1 _ ,B)x:.+f(l _ u)1+P. (21 )
Nt 
The arbitrage condition becomes 
(j1+p ) 
Zt+1 = (1 - ,B)X-;:1 ( 1 +n Zt - (1 - u)I+P Xt+1 , (22) 
4l'iotice that the utility function is concave in C2, implying that individuals are risk-averse and that 
they optimally like to diversify their investments. The asset market equilibrium predicts that individuals 
buy the market portfolio. 
3 
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where Zt is equal to the value of shares per person qt/Nt . 
The equality between savings and investment can be written as 
Using the conditions (12) to (16), it becomes 
(1 - (})/3 d 1-0 d (23)Xt+l = 1 +n X t - (1 +n)(l _ u) Zt· 
Equations (22) and (23) characterize a dynamic system in Z and x. 
The optimal capital/labor ratio follows a process (23) which is very similar to the one 
obtained in the standard Diamond model. There are however three main differences with 
the Diamond model: One difference comes from the wage bargaining process (represented 
by the parameter /3). Considering (23) at given Zt, union power has a positive effect 
on the capital-labour ratio as in Devereux and Lockwood (1991). This is because an 
increase in union power increases the wages of the young workers, increasing therefore their 
savings and reducing the rate of return. The second difference comes from the presence 
of uncertainty and heterogeneity (represented by the parameter p). An increase in the 
variance of the productivity shock reduces the value of p. This increase in uncertainty 
leads to an increase in the probability of non-utilisation of the equipment, i.e., a decrease 
in the marginal productivity of capital. Finally, the fact that firms obtain pure profits 
under efficient bargaining makes them valuable. This requires the existence of a market for 
shares whose arbitrage condition introduces a second dimension in the dynamic system. 
In this case, the analysis of the model is more complicated than in the neo-classical case. 
To have a better understanding of the model let us first compute the steady state 
behind (22) and (23) before analysing the dynamics more carefully. 
The steady state 
The steady state value for x and Z should satisfy the following system computed from 
(22) and (23): 
(1 +n)(l - u) [(1 - (})/3d 1-0 ]
-'----'--- X - xZ d 1 + n 
P[(1 -/3)x(l _ u)l+p] [(1 -/3)dl+ _ xo ]-1Z = l+n 
These two equations are drawn in Figure 3. The first equation defines a function z(x) 
which passes through the origin. The second equation defines a function z(x), which also 
passes through the origin and is ont defined at point B where 
(1 -/3)dP+1] 1/0 
XB = [ l+n 
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Figure 3: The steady state 
z / 
o 
E A B 
As it is shown in the appendix, the first function z(x) is concave and start from 0 
with an infinite slope. The second function is convex at the left of the discontinuity point, 
with a positive and finite slope at 0 and an infinite slope at XB. There is therefore an 
intersection G of these two functions at the left of the discontinuity point, ensuring the 
existence of a steady state with a positive x and z. 5 
r\'otice that if we assume zero depreciation of capital, the analysis is quite simpler. In 
this case, equation (12) becomes 
rt = (1- ,8)(1 - a)l+I/px;o 
and the system for computing the steady state is: 
(1 +n)(l - u) [(1 - ()),8d 1-0 ] 
z = -'---"'""'----x - x d 1 + n 
(1 + n )(1 - u)l+P 
z - xdl+p 
SLet us illustrate this with a numerical example. Taking Cl' =0.35, p = 10 (which corresponds to a 
standard-error of the shock of 15% by (10)), 8 = .6, (3 = .5 and n = 1.0130 (a yearly growth of population 
of 1%), the unemployment rate is 10%, the degree of utilisation of capacities is 96 %, the capital/labour 
ratio is 0.0007 implying through (16) an yearly real interest rate of 4.7%. 
4 
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Figure 4: The phase diagram 
T ~Zt+l = 0 
Z 
L r 
x 
In this case, the second equation defines a linear relation between Z and x and is no longer 
affected by union power. The steady state equilibrium is . 
_ 1 
.. _ [(1 - ()){3dl+ 1/P J Q 
x - ,
l+n 
which is equal to the standard Diamond equilibrium when {3 = 1 and d = 1. 
Dynamic analysis 
Replacing Xt+l from (22) in (23), the dynamic system gives now the change in Xt+l and 
Zt+l as a function of their past levels. 
(1 - ()){3d- 1-0 d 
x - Xt - Ztl+n t (l+n)(l-u) 
(1 - (3)dl+ P [(1 - ()){3 d 1-0 d J-0 
Zt l+n l+n Xt -(l+n)(l_u)Zt 
-(1 _ (3) [(1 - ()){3 dx 1- o _ d ZtJ 1-0 (1 _ u)l+P 
l+n t (l+n)(l-u) 
The phase diagram for this system is presented in Figure 4. The concave phaseline 
~Xt+l = 0 coming from the first equation describe the equilibrium locus where savings 
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Figure 5: Union power and the capital/labour ratio 
z 
x 
are equal to investment in shares and physical capital. The convex phaseline AZt+1 = 0 
coming from the second equation describes the equilibrium locus where the return to 
physical capital is equal to the dividend per share plus the capital gain. The arrows 
indicate the directions of motion. As in standard growth models, the loglinearization 
of the dynamic system arould the steady state confirms that there is a unique saddle 
path 'converging (locally) to the steady-state. Under rational expectations the economy 
is always located on the saddle path. 
Let us now consider the effect of a rIse III umon power on the steady-state capi-
tal/labour ratio and on its dynamics. 
Considering first the concave phaseline AXt+l = 0, it is clear that this will move to 
the l\orth- West. This first effect is the one present in Devereux and Lockwood (1991). 
Since in their model, the second phaseline is not affected by union power, the equilibrium 
moves from point A in Figure 5 to point B. The increase in union power increases the 
wages of the young workers, increasing therefore their savings and the capital stock and 
reduces the rate of return. 
Considering now the convex phase line .6zt+1 = 0 it can be shown that it moves also 
to the North West. Through (12) and (21), at given capital/labor ratio, a rise in union 
power cuts the dividends 7r less than it cuts the interest rate r on physical capital (as 
long as the depreciation rate is non-zero). This requires a rise in the value of the firm to 
maintain the arbitrage condition. This rise in the value of the firm could be achieved by 
an increase in the probability of using the capital stock implying a reduction in physical 
capital. 
Therefore, in the presence of capital irreversibility, there is a second effect of union 
power on the stock of capital which goes in the opposite direction of the first one. The new 
steady state is in C with an ambiguous net effect on the capital/labor ratio (remember 
that through (13) there is a monotonous relation between the stock of capital per head 
and the capital/labour ratio). 
--------------_.._-----------------
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The dynamics related to a rise in union power goes as follows. In the case depicted in 
Figure 5, the net effect on the capital stock is negative. In this case, at the time of the 
change in union power, the economy jumps on the new saddle path and the value of the 
firm rises above its steady state level. Then the capital stock starts declining, so does the 
value of the firm, in order to reach the new steady state at C. If the net effect of the rise 
in union power on the capital stock at steady state is positive, there is no overshooting of 
the value of the firm and both variables increase monotonically to their new steady state 
value. 
Conclusion 
In this model, which is a particular case of a more general model where the utility function 
is homotetic and the ex-ante production function has constant returns to scale, we show 
that there is underemployment of production factors at equilibrium, even at the steady 
state. The result depends crucially on the putty-clay technology, the existence of firm-
specific skill (labor market segmentation) and irreversible investment and on technological 
uncertainty. 
The existence of unemployment and of capacity underutilisation is independent from 
the presence of unions. Because of capital depreciation (linked with irreversibility), the 
role of unions in the model is different from the one in Devereux and Lockwood (1991). 
In particular their result that union power affects positively the capital stock is no longer 
true., In the presence of capital irreversibility (or more generally, when there is a non-zero 
depreciation rate), the effect of union power on the stock of capital is ambiguous. 
Both heterogeneity and uncertainty play a crucial role in this economy. When uncer-
tainty and heterogeneity disappear, capacities become full-employed and the unemploy-
ment rate goes to zero. When there is uncertainty but there is not heterogeneity, i.e., 
if uncertainty is not idiosyncratic, all firms will be in the same situation at equilibrium. 
Under these conditions two types of equilibrium could be possible, full-employment with 
underutilization of capacities or full-capacity with unemployment. To generate simulta-
neously unemployment and underutilization of capacities the existence of heterogeneity 
IS necessary. 
Underemployment results from the fact that the irreversible skill decisions of the house-
holds and the investment decisions of the firms are taken without knowing with certainty 
the firms productivity for the next period. Once the shock has occured, it is to late to 
revise its plan and to move to more favorable micro-markets. This result can be inter-
preted, as in Sneessens and Dreze (1986), as inducing some "mismatch" in the economy. 
The "mismatch" depends on the existence of firm specific uncertainty and heterogeneity. 
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Appendix 
The steady state is given by: 
z = (1 + n~l- u) ((1;:~dX1-0 _ X) (1) 
P 
Z =(1 - ,B)x1- 0(1 _ u)l+P [(1 - ,B)dl+ x-o _ 1] -1 (11) 
l+n 
Let us first consider the function z(x) given by (1). This function has two roots, one at point E 
of Figure 3 (where the capital labour ratio is equal to 0) and one at C where 
x = [(1 - 9),Bd] 1/0 
1 + n 
The function attains its maximum at A where 
x = [(1 - 0:)(1 - 9),Bd] 1/0 
l+n 
Its first derivative is: 
, (1 - 0:)(1 - 9),Bd _0 
z ex: x-I,l+n 
which is positive as long as 
x < [(1 - 0:)(1 - 9),Bd] 1/0 
l+n 
The value of z' when x = 0 is 
z'(O) ex: 00. 
The second-derivative is: 
11 -0-1 
Z ex: -o:x , 
\vhich is always negative. 
Let us now consider the function z( x) given in (II). Its first derivative is 
, (1 - ,B)dl+P 0((1 - ,B)dl+P 0) -2 
Z ex: - (1 - o:)x - xl+n l+n' 
which is positive as long as 
x < [ (1 - ,B)dP+1 ] 1/0 
(l-o:)(l+n) 
The value of this derivative when x =0 is 
'( ) 1 + n 
z 0 ex: (1 _ ,B)dl+P' 
which is finite. The second derivative of this function is: 
1 
, ((1 - ,B)dP+ ) ( (1 - ,B)dP+1 )z ex: - XO (1 + 0:) - (1 - o:)XO ,l+n l+n 
which is positive as long as 
(1 - ,B)dP+1]1/0 [(1 _ ,B)dP+1(1 +0:)] 1/0 
x < or x >[ (l+n) (l-o:)(l+n) 
The first function z( x) is concave and start from 0 with an infinite slope. The second function 
has a vertical asymptote, is convex at the left of the asymptote and start from 0 with a finite 
slope. There is therefore an intersection of these two functions at the left of the asymptote, 
ensuring the existence of a steady state. 
---._---_._------------------------------
